By Adriaan Schout and Judith Hoevenaars (Instituut Clingendael)
The eurocrisis has reignited debates on subsidiarity. On June 21st, the Dutch government presented the (disappointing) results of a subsidiarity review, listing 54 EU measures or policy fields which could better be regulated at the national level. The UK is working on a more extensive proposal to flow back European powers to the national level. These national exercises are a response to delinking enthusiasm for the ‘ever closer union’, while Brussels’ influence over the Member States grows. Subsidiarity, which governs the exercise of European powers, is under pressure as EU competences are expanding and it is no surprise that it tops the agenda in several Member States.
Yet, the principle of subsidiarity suffers from institutional vagueness. Subsidiarity is not just a technical or judicial concept, but also a political one. A legalistic interpretation of subsidiarity would emphasise that the EU should legislate ‘as closely as possible to the citizens’, especially in areas where it has no exclusive competence. However, the application of the principle, of which the rules are laid down in Protocol No 2 attached to the Treaties, inherently entails a political assessment. Subsidiarity is aimed at preventing unnecessary centralisation of powers just because that would favour the functioning of the EU in the view of the European institutions. Hence, the Commission has to justify each new proposal with a convincing argumentation why Europeanisation is required. Yet, the eurocrisis has stretched the boundaries of subsidiarity and the division of competences between Member States and the EU to its limits.
As it seems, the EU Commission’s political agenda is to centralise more powers in Brussels. In this respect, the Commission is using the political opportunity and room of maneuver in the application of the principle of subsidiarity to expand EU control. Barroso calls for a full banking, economic, fiscal and political union in the ‘Blueprint for a deep and genuine economic and monetary union’. His vision of the EU includes European ministers, an increased EU budget and centralised banking supervision. In particular, the Blueprint calls for centralisation of democratic control by the European Parliament. The institutional ambitions of the Commission and its wish for further conferral of competences to the EU level are legitimised by underlining that “national economic policy-making paid insufficient attention to the European context within which the economies operate”. In other words, the message is that the Member States can’t govern their economies, so national competences have to be handed over so that the EU will do it for them.
The blueprint is not written in the spirit of subsidiarity, exploring how the national administrations of the Member States can be strengthened to meet EU requirements, but from a centralised perspective. In response to the eurocrisis, the economic governance powers of the Commission have already expanded substantially. In the traditional division of roles the European institutions would set the standards (3% and 60%), the national governments or regions would be responsible for the implementation and the Commission would monitor and control the Member States. The EU reaction to the crisis has set aside this model of governance, deviating from the principle of subsidiarity, by pleading for more powers and budgets.
The principle of subsidiarity is reduced to a mere check box in the legislative procedure and has fallen victim to the political aspirations of the Commission. National governments and especially national parliaments – as guardians of the principle of subsidiarity – must ensure a strong subsidiarity test as a mandatory part of each EU legislative process also when it comes to the responses to the eurocrisis.