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2013: A Year in the Crisis

15. January 2014, von Alexandre Abreu, Comments (0)

So here we are in 2014. As this edition of the Euro Crisis blog draws to a close, it is time to say farewell to the readers and greet the new contributors who will take over and comment on the Euro zone crisis as it develops from here on in. Farewells are also an appropriate time for stock-taking exercises, however, so I think it is appropriate to end my contribution by reviewing what the latest year has meant for the bigger picture of the Euro crisis – at least the way I see it. What progress has been made in the various fronts? And how much closer are we to a resolution of the crisis?

Perhaps not surprisingly, my views are considerably less optimistic than those of most other analysts, many of whom seem to consider that the worse of the crisis is largely behind us. I, on the contrary, believe that we are still far from hitting the bottom, let alone from a resolution. And I also believe that we end the year 2013 in a worse position that we started it.

First, take the superficial element of the crisis: the sovereign debt levels of the eurozone countries. (Superficial in the sense that, as I and many others have argued before, they are a consequence, not a cause, of the crisis.) Between the second quarter of 2012 and the same quarter of 2013 (the latest for which Eurostat has available comparable data), in a context of widespread austerity, absolute public debt levels increased in Austria, Belgium, Cyprus, Estonia, Finland, France, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, Malta, the Netherlands, Portugal, Slovenia, Slovakia and Spain. That is to say, in every single eurozone country except for Germany and Latvia. As a percentage of GDP, government debt increased in all 18 eurozone countries except for Austria, Germany and Latvia – including to such remarkable levels as Greece’s 169%, Portugal’s 131%, Ireland’s 126% and Spain’s 92%. Not quite unexpected given the obviously recessive consequences of austerity, but certainly not a sign of progress towards a resolution: greater debt levels mean a greater burden constraining the possibility of counter-cyclical fiscal policy (particularly with the Fiscal Compact in place) and, at least in the Portuguese and Greek cases, a greater amount which will not, for it cannot, be repaid (whether this be through haircuts or sovereign defaults).

More significantly, though, the more fundamental economic variables which encapsulate the nature of the crisis have either deteriorated or remained unaltered during the course of 2013: the massively negative external debt, or international investment position, of the peripheral Euro zone countries (the ‘divergence’ component of the crisis) remained basically unaltered, save for some marginal improvement in the case of Ireland. As for the overall economic performance (the ‘stagnation’ element of the crisis), the outlook also continues to be profoundly depressing: annual GDP growth in the euro area as a whole in 2013 is estimated at -0.4%, while euro area unemployment remains at a record 12.1%. At the same time, the constraints weighing down on that performance have not alleviated: the deleveraging of the private (household and corporate) sector remains to be done, while the spectrum of deflation is an ever-more-present possibility, further worsening the debt overhang and giving rise to recessive debt-deflation dynamics.

At the political and institutional levels, we now have a Fiscal Compact in place which has basically banned counter-cyclical fiscal policy at a time when monetary policy has become well-nigh ineffective; a ‘banking union’ which has not broken the vicious links between troubled banks and troubled sovereigns; a minuscule EU budget slashing all hopes of a recovery led by counter-cyclical policy at the European level; unrelenting insistence on austerity as supposed way out; discontent with the European project growing steadily across the EU; the far right increasingly showing its ugly head as it takes advantage of the European leaders’ incapacity or unwillingness to address the real root causes of the crisis; and a full-fledged humanitarian crisis in large swathes of the European periphery. Hardly grounds for optimism.

Having said this, it is no doubt true that the eurozone crisis has changed its character during the course of 2013: in contrast to earlier on in the year, we no longer experience the crisis as a series of acute episodes, in which the possibility of a dénouement is just around the corner. Instead, we have entered a largely chronic stage, with neither collapse nor improvement in sight. A significant indicator in this respect consists of the interest rate levels on sovereign debt throughout the eurozone: even though the economic outlook has continued to worsen, interest rates, particularly in the eurozone periphery, have fallen significantly over the course of 2013, thus alleviating one of the most acute dimensions of the crisis. By and large a continuation of the ‘Draghi effect’ (the ECB’s manifest willingness to do whatever it takes to prevent defaults in the Euro zone, provided that austerity remains in place), but unintelligible without taking into account the extent to which resistance to austerity has so far failed to materialise at the political level (thus rendering this deleterious low-level political-economic equilibrium much more stable than it seemed 12 months ago).

But this equilibrium will not last, for austerity and deflation are exactly the key ingredients of permanent recession in our current debt overhang situation – and sooner or later the electorate, in at least one of the more chastised countries, will prefer default and the possibility of a euro exit, for all their risks, to the certainty of perpetual impoverishment. In 2013 the crisis turned into chronic stagnation, but we should not let ourselves be fooled by this apparent calm: it only takes one card to bring the house down.

May you have a happy 2014, dear reader – and in these times of crisis, may Europe and its peoples live up to the lofty democratic ideals which the continent has spawned throughout its history.

Europe For Citizens

“This project has been funded with support from the European Commission. This publication reflects the views only of the author, and the Commission cannot be held responsible for any use which may be made of the information contained therein.”

Parallel Currencies are no Alternative for the Euro

21. October 2013, von Adriaan Schout, Comments (0)

Many are upset about the ‘TINA-type solutions’ for the euro crisis. ‘There-is-no-alternative’ (TINA) seems to have been an irrevocable characteristic of the euro right from the start. A sense of ‘having been forced onto the people’ was kindled by the fact that in most countries the single currency was adopted without referenda. Subsequently, many of the measures including EFSF, ESM, disputable bail-outs of governments and banks by the ECB, sharpening up of the stability and growth pact and the 2pack (which forces Member States to hand in national budgets before being adopted in parliament) have all contributed to the image of the euro as extremely risky and as an undemocratic intrusion on national competences. On top of this, many countries struggle with the constraints of the dubious 3% rule. If economic governance is to work, Barroso in his blueprint has given a clear insight into what it involves, including an EU finance minister and EU bonds.

There is a sizeable group in the eurozone that does not want these TINA-type steps towards a federalised and centralised EU. Many would like to leave the EU straight away. Others, such as German Professor Kerber and adepts of The Matheo Solution, suggest to introduce types of parallel currencies or currency units (calculation currencies such as the ECU). According to Kerber, if southern states do not want to leave the euro zone, then the countries with a current account surplus should introduce their own currency. He suggests that since the relevant northern countries are only Germany, the Netherlands, Austria, Finland and possibly Luxembourg, the new currency might as well be the DM under the watchful eye of the Deutsche Bundesbank.

Hopes of a parallel currency immediately lead to serious questions (even if we ignore the political complications and impossibilities). Firstly, there are legal questions about breaking away from the eurozone. Will the Commission use all legal means to ensure the integrity of the eurozone? Secondly, one should not think lightly of the consequences for the competitiveness of the new DM block when the DM revaluates. Thirdly, a break-up would complicate the necessary steps towards the banking union even more and thwart the internal market at least in financial services. With bouts of devaluations, any banking resolution mechanism would be frail. However, most worryingly of all would be the fall back towards the ERM (European Exchange Rate Mechanism) days when especially southern countries had to devalue repeatedly. This had profound economic consequences including financial losses while structural changes continued to be stalled and spells of high unemployment because countries mostly postponed devaluations to ensure prestige. (B. Connolly (1994), The Rotten Heart of Europe, Faber and Faber.)

The changes for successful reforms in countries outside the euro framework are (decidedly) lower than within the eurozone. The best options for structural changes in expenditures, labour market reforms, tax reforms, deregulation, anti-corruption policies, rule of law measures, banking supervision, etc. are within the euro system. This will, in the long run also benefit the eurozone and EU more broadly.

Evidently, the costs of dealing with the current bubbles in the eurozone are huge. However, these costs in terms of ban risks and government deficits have already been committed and have been shifted to, among others, the balance of the ECB. They will not go away with a break-up of the euro. Inside or outside the euro, adaptations will remain expensive.

Of course, we can throw away all hope for reform in countries such as France, Italy and Greece. If we are so negative, we would better dismantle the euro as soon as possible. However, it would be in all our interests to ensure reforms. Changes seem to be taking place in and, in any case, prospects for reform are best within the eurozone (ask the Dutch).

Parallel currencies show at least that alternatives for the euro do exist but it seems wise to keep such disruptive alternatives at bay for the time being. Thoughts about parallel currencies are signs of serious euro frustration but not of ‘cold thinking’.

Europe For Citizens

“This project has been funded with support from the European Commission. This publication reflects the views only of the author, and the Commission cannot be held responsible for any use which may be made of the information contained therein.”

Blog Authors

Adriaan SchoutAdriaan Schout

Dr Adriaan Schout is Deputy Director Research/Europe at Clingendael, Netherlands Institute of International relations. (read more...)

Alexandre AbreuAlexandre Abreu

Dr Alexandre Abreu is a 33-year-old Portuguese economist with a PhD from the University of London. Currently he is a lecturer in Development Economics at the Institute of Economics and Business Administration, Technical University of Lisbon, and a Researcher at the Centre for African and Development Studies of the same University.

Almut MöllerAlmut Möller

Almut Möller is a political analyst in European integration and European foreign policy. She is currently the head of the Alfred von Oppenheim Centre for European Policy Studies at the German Council on Foreign Relations (DGAP) in Berlin. (read more...)

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