Many are upset about the ‘TINA-type solutions’ for the euro crisis. ‘There-is-no-alternative’ (TINA) seems to have been an irrevocable characteristic of the euro right from the start. A sense of ‘having been forced onto the people’ was kindled by the fact that in most countries the single currency was adopted without referenda. Subsequently, many of the measures including EFSF, ESM, disputable bail-outs of governments and banks by the ECB, sharpening up of the stability and growth pact and the 2pack (which forces Member States to hand in national budgets before being adopted in parliament) have all contributed to the image of the euro as extremely risky and as an undemocratic intrusion on national competences. On top of this, many countries struggle with the constraints of the dubious 3% rule. If economic governance is to work, Barroso in his blueprint has given a clear insight into what it involves, including an EU finance minister and EU bonds.
There is a sizeable group in the eurozone that does not want these TINA-type steps towards a federalised and centralised EU. Many would like to leave the EU straight away. Others, such as German Professor Kerber and adepts of The Matheo Solution, suggest to introduce types of parallel currencies or currency units (calculation currencies such as the ECU). According to Kerber, if southern states do not want to leave the euro zone, then the countries with a current account surplus should introduce their own currency. He suggests that since the relevant northern countries are only Germany, the Netherlands, Austria, Finland and possibly Luxembourg, the new currency might as well be the DM under the watchful eye of the Deutsche Bundesbank.
Hopes of a parallel currency immediately lead to serious questions (even if we ignore the political complications and impossibilities). Firstly, there are legal questions about breaking away from the eurozone. Will the Commission use all legal means to ensure the integrity of the eurozone? Secondly, one should not think lightly of the consequences for the competitiveness of the new DM block when the DM revaluates. Thirdly, a break-up would complicate the necessary steps towards the banking union even more and thwart the internal market at least in financial services. With bouts of devaluations, any banking resolution mechanism would be frail. However, most worryingly of all would be the fall back towards the ERM (European Exchange Rate Mechanism) days when especially southern countries had to devalue repeatedly. This had profound economic consequences including financial losses while structural changes continued to be stalled and spells of high unemployment because countries mostly postponed devaluations to ensure prestige. (B. Connolly (1994), The Rotten Heart of Europe, Faber and Faber.)
The changes for successful reforms in countries outside the euro framework are (decidedly) lower than within the eurozone. The best options for structural changes in expenditures, labour market reforms, tax reforms, deregulation, anti-corruption policies, rule of law measures, banking supervision, etc. are within the euro system. This will, in the long run also benefit the eurozone and EU more broadly.
Evidently, the costs of dealing with the current bubbles in the eurozone are huge. However, these costs in terms of ban risks and government deficits have already been committed and have been shifted to, among others, the balance of the ECB. They will not go away with a break-up of the euro. Inside or outside the euro, adaptations will remain expensive.
Of course, we can throw away all hope for reform in countries such as France, Italy and Greece. If we are so negative, we would better dismantle the euro as soon as possible. However, it would be in all our interests to ensure reforms. Changes seem to be taking place in and, in any case, prospects for reform are best within the eurozone (ask the Dutch).
Parallel currencies show at least that alternatives for the euro do exist but it seems wise to keep such disruptive alternatives at bay for the time being. Thoughts about parallel currencies are signs of serious euro frustration but not of ‘cold thinking’.
